DENY (b)(1)(a)(5) (b) (5)

RCF - DOD

April 11, 1963

HENORANDUM FOR: 3 - The Secretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: U-2 Flights, Cube - Contingency Plans.

Attached is a revised version of contingency plans on U-2 flights over Cubs which takes account of formal come made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary McMamara wil discussing this draft with the JCS tomorrow acrains.

Encleaure:

AD ETETEL




OASO(PA) OFOISR


COVER MEMO DATED APRILII, 1963 DECLASSIFIED BY: DEP. DIR IA REGON, DASDITA) ON: 3100T1989



# U-2 FLICHTL OWNE - COME GLOTT PLANS



# **DRAFT FOLLOWS**



# 'U-2' FLIGHTS, CUBA '-- CONTINGINCY PLANS

# FACTS BEARING ON PRODUCT

- A. While not a containty, precent intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information usual be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- 2. There is no presently available alternative to 8-2 surveillance which which would neet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable end-militarily product to bring our forces, if I portionizely SAC, to a high degree of readiress as well as to execuate lapordents from Guantanano and reinforce that burs. I'm' steps would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiate.

  Without almost includes public impoletys.
- 2. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and [weather permitting, it is dilitarily possible to now he against a single SAN cite within the daylight hours of the arms for as a U-2 is destroyed.
- 2. Political support argues for as such advance notice as possible to our principal allies, proticularly those in Europe that might be enjoyable to enjoy and

SECRET OADR

wlangered by Soviet retaliation.

The longer the period of direct or indirect warning to khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

# 

- a. <u>With public vivences wereing and/or other indicators of indepent Coviet agent. Fellower by:</u>
  - l. Unoversessivi sytucia.
  - 2. Smooncolulration and a second a second and a second and a second and a second and a second an
  - in the control of the second of the control of the
  - Seviet region:
  - 1. Unpreparative autacit.
  - 2. Stoppowid aviach and a
- 3. Elminge by Sovieto of Carlin and Cuba.

# INT. SUCRESTED COURSES OF ACTUAL:

- A. Public advance terming by Soviets uniform other indicators of a claimet of Soviet action:
  - 1. Stand down U-1 Mighto.

SECRET OADL

- represtions by declaration of entre mints Initiate militur DI TON in all G. S. exemends. Prequation of describents and
- relacement of Junaturano, etc.
- ٦. Tellore Mag.
- 4. Prosidential rearaiss to Hacrillan, idenoism, de Poulle and Annfani.
- Call Or an of Conceltation, CAS, to obtain reaffirmation 5. necessity of everylights.
- 6. Inform Jeorgiany General of the Inited Actions and consider what additional Emited Marions action should be writen.
- 7. Transmit Asserts from the President to Urnahabev. 3. Public chatement by the President, including a massa a to the

Orban coule.

sites.

- 5. With act plating of military engagestions within about 72 hours resume "-2 flichts. 10. If there is a chigge unsuccessful attack on a V-2, recordly ammounce mublicly, including fact 7-2 flights will on times.
- but do not at this starp attack TWY site. 11. If there is a second attack -- amore as all or mesuchessial -promptly take int the Mai site identified as beging oranic aut
- the attack. 7.2. If attacks to resumal, similtaneously take out resulting take

- 3. No prior public warming or indicators of invient Sound taction
  - 1. Unsuccessful autack:
    - a. Announce artificity fact of a stock.
    - . Tare all mensures union III. A. alove.
  - 2. Successful antack.
    - a. Initiate military preparations for attack on SAI site.
    - b. Jeolare appropriate PL. Wolfs in all United States commands, and Unitiate executation of dependents and actinforcement of Stantanano.
    - c. Transmit Precidential massage to Ukrusholev For delivery at hour attack on INT is to be launched. (Largage should simultaneously be given to Script Arbaneously in Mashington.)
    - d. Enform NAO impediatoly prior to abtecit.
      - Transmit instructions to MSUR to inform Resolvency Summed of the United Mations at time actual is initiated and call for immediate Security Council modeling at some time.
      - f. Call neuting of Organ of Consultation of the CAS we closely as possible to time attack schoduled.
    - g. Transmit Presidential messages to Albrauar, Lacrillan, de Gaulle and PonCont.
    - ii. Issue public statement by Procident as hour abtect is launched.
    - i. Carry out attack on Mentified SAN site.

C. Limitage





J. Minitage by Sovieta of Corlin and Ouha.

If Jovieta wholly or providily blocked butlin in respond to being a State of attack against all sites, immodification of convint luminapartite shoup to consider implementation or appropriate modifice into a Territory against a confider in a consider with a to confider with a to confider with a to confider with a confider.

G:UAJohnson:ges

SECRET OAD R



# TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW

### SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Seretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Contigency Planning - U-2 Flights, Cuba

Attached is a draft of a paper on this subject worked out by Paul Nitze, a Joint Staff representative, and myself. Annexes to back up the intelligence aspects on page 1 are being prepared.

Work in particular still needs to be done on what, if any, substantive positions could be taken that would give Khrushchev a "way out."

### U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS

### I. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM:

- A. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washngton should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- B. There is no presently available alternative to U-2 surveillance which would meet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable and militarily prudent to bring our forces, particularly SAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and reinforce that base. Fuel stops would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiated without almost immediate public knowledge.
- D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined
  - and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is militarily possible to mount an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day as U-2 is destroyed.
  - E. Political support argues for as much advance notice as possible to our principal allies, particularly those in Europe that might be

- endangered by Soviet retaliation.
- F. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

## II. [ ILLEGIBLE ]:

A. With public advance warning and/or other indications of imminent Soviet

action. Followed by:

- 1. Unsuccessful attack.
- 2. Successful attack [excised]
- B. <u>Without</u> advance public warning and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action:
  - 1. Unsuccessful attack.
  - 2. Successful attack
- C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

# III. SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION:

- A. Public advance warning by Soviets and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action.
  - 1. Stand down U-2 flights

- Initiate military preparations by declaration of appropriate DEFCON in all U.S. commands, evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo, etc.
- 3. Inform MAC.
- Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Fanfani.
- 5. Call Organ of Consultation, OAS, to obtain affirmation necessity of overflights.
- necessity of overflights.

  6. Inform Secretary General of the United Nations and consider
- what additional United States action should be taken.
  7. Transmi message from the President to Khrushchev.
- 8. Public statement by the President, including a message to the Cuban people.
- 9. Upon completion of military preparations within about 72 hours resume U-2 flights.
- announce publicly, including fact U-2 flights will continue, but do not at this stage attack SAM site.

  11. If there is a second attack successful or unsuccessful -

10. If there is a single unsuccessful attack on a U-2, promptly

- promptly take out the SAM site identified as having carried out the attack.
- 12. If attacks are resumed, simultaneously take out remaining SAM sites.

# B. No prior public warning or indication of imminent Soviet action:

- 1. Unsuccessful attack:
  - a. Announce publicly fact of attack.
  - b. Take all measures under III.A. above.

### 2. Successful attack:

- a. Initiate military precautions for attack on SAM site.
- b. Declare appropriate DEFCON in all United States commands, and initiate evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
- c. Transit Presidential message to Khrushchev for delivery at hour attack on SAM is to be launched. (Message should simultaneously be given to Soviet Ambassador in Washington.)
- d. Inform MAC immediately prior to attack.
- e. Transmit instructions with USUN to inform Secretary General of the United Nations at time attack is initiated and call for immediate Security Council meeting at same time.
- f. Call meeting of Organ of Consultation of the OAS as closely as possible to time attack scheduled.
- g. Transmit Presidential message to Adenauer, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Fanfani.
- h. Issue public statement by President at hour attack is launched.
- i. Carry out attack on identified SAM site.

# C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba:

If Soviets wholly of partially blockade Berlin in response to United States attack against SAM sites, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of appropriate modification of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with regard to Berlin.